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Structural realism first emerged as an epistemological thesis aimed 
to avoid the so-called pessimistic meta-induction on the history of 
science. Some authors, however, suggested that the preservation of 
structure across theory-change is best explained by endorsing the 
metaphysical thesis that structure is all there is. While the 
possibility of this latter, „ontic‟ form of structural realism has been 
extensively debated, though, not much has been said concerning its 
justification. In this paper, I distinguish between two arguments in 
favour of ontic structural realism that can be reconstructed from the 
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The fundamental intuition underpinning scientific realism is expressed by the so-called 
„no-miracle argument‟ (NMA) (Putnam 1975, 73), according to which the success of 
science is to be explained in terms of the (approximate) truth of scientific theories.
1
 
Standard, object-oriented realism has it that successful theories are (approximately) true 
descriptions of individual objects that exist mind-independently and of their properties. 
The pessimistic meta-induction on the history of science (PMI) (Laudan, 1981), however, 
threatens to sever the link between success and truth by pointing to past theories that were 
successful to some extent but are now considered false. 
Structural realism (SR) attempts to re-establish the connection between success and truth 
by pointing at the structural continuity that exists between (some parts of some) subsequent 
theories across theory-change. SRists propose that we take (preserved - perhaps via some 
correspondence principle) structure as the (approximately) true part of such theories. 
Epistemic structural realism (ESR) (Worrall 1989) intends this as an epistemological 
position, to the effect that we can be realists about whatever is described by the (preserved) 
mathematical structure of our theories. Ladyman (1998) introduced instead ontic structural 
realism (OSR), according to which not only is structure all we can be realist about, but it is 
also all there is.  
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 Whether there is a full-scale argument or just an intuition is open to debate, but this is not 
important for present purposes. 
  
In the last decade or so, the latter idea has been developed further and has become 
increasingly fashionable. On the one hand, OSRists argued that 1) it is possible to conceive 
of the world in structural terms, as there is nothing that remains unaccounted for when one 
subscribe to a structuralist ontology. On the other hand, OSRists also contended that 2) 
scientific realists should endorse OSR, as a careful consideration of the best available 
scientific theories lends stronger support to it than to other non-instrumentalist positions. 
The discussion of 1) has occupied most of the literature, and it appears fair to say that 
criticisms aiming to show that the proposed ontology is unworkable don‟t cause too much 
trouble for OSRists. Relations, and consequently structures, can be primitive (Mertz 2003) 
and a plausible structural reconstruction of persistence, change and causality can be 
provided (French 2003). Moreover, the claim being put forward (in the great majority of 
cases, at least) is not that the world is mathematical structure, so charges of conflating the 
mathematical and the physical (Cao 2003) are off the mark. As for the objection that OSR 
only applies in a very limited field, it has also been answered - by extending OSR to 
domains other than physics (Ladyman and Ross 2007; Ross 2008; Kincaid 2008). 
However, much less has been said about 2), that is, about the justification for OSR. To fill 
this gap, it is essential, first of all, to analyse the relationship between ESR and OSR. 
 
2. The relationship between ESR and OSR 
One may be inclined to believe that ESR is a stronger claim than OSR on the basis that it 
requires commitment to structure - i.e., relations - and individuals (possibly, with monadic 
properties) bearing those relations. Worrall (1989) does indeed echo Poincaré (1905/1952) 
  
in claiming that relations are all we know, but individual objects - which „Nature will hide 
forever from our eyes‟ – exist in addition to them. However, ESR is a purely 
epistemological thesis concerning the preservation of structure across theory change and its 
usefulness for avoiding the PMI. And the Worrall-Poincaré line of thought follows from an 
adherence to commonsense which is only natural if one refrains in this way from asking 
metaphysical questions. In other words, ESR does not rely in any way on a „positive‟ 
ontological commitment to the existence of objects.
2
 
On the other hand, supporters of OSR have argued that, since the basic assumption 
underlying SR is that we can know structure only, we should adopt a structuralist ontology 
if only not to create an unacceptable gap between epistemology and metaphysics. 
However, setting aside the fact that - to repeat - the realist doesn‟t need to say anything 
about metaphysics at all, it is essential to notice that the elements preserved across theory 
change are (or at least might be) different from those invoked by OSRists. The former are 
whatever properties (not necessarily limited to polyadic relations!) are described by the 
mathematical structures that get preserved across theory change. The latter are instead 
genuine relations, and of a special kind (as we will see in more detail shortly): those that 
play essential roles in defining specific theoretical descriptions of things, independently of 
previous theories.
3
 In fact, that the epistemic element and the metaphysical element (may) 
play distinct roles is something that at least some OSRists openly acknowledge (French 
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 This is why it has been suggested (Morganti 2004) that ESR is best understood as 
agnostic about the existence of individual relata over and above the preserved structure.  
3
 This will become clearer in what follows. 
  
2006, 173). Moreover, even assuming that structural preservation suggests a structuralist 
ontology of the kind envisaged by OSRists, the former is not a sufficient basis for the 
latter. For, filling the alleged gap between epistemology and metaphysics exclusively on 
the basis of contingent facts about what got preserved in the history of science may well 
lead one to ignore important metaphysical elements. In addition to the historical evidence 
of continuity pointed at to neutralise the PMI, therefore, a consideration of the 
metaphysical import of our best current theories is also required if the move from the 
epistemological to the metaphysical level is to be made. 
As things stand, then, it seems fair to claim that OSR is in fact stronger and more 
committing than ESR: for, it amounts to a conjunction of i) an epistemological claim of 
preservation of structure across theory-change (the „core‟ structural realist thesis aimed to 
defuse the PMI) plus ii) a form of eliminativist metaphysics which is an independent 





3. The argument from underdetermination 
In the early years of OSR, the argument provided in support of its eliminativist 
metaphysical component, mainly by French and Ladyman (Ladyman 1998; French and 
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 Intermediate, or moderate, versions of SR – according to which relata and relations are 
(at least in some cases) metaphysically on a par in terms of ontological priority - (see, for 
example, Esfeld and Lam 2008) gain plausibility only to the extent that OSR does. Hence, 
these will not be explicitly considered here. 
  
Ladyman 2003), was based on an alleged underdetermination in the ontological 
interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. It can be reconstructed as follows: 
1. The existence of compelling reasons and of a valid alternative are necessary 
requisites for the modification of entrenched metaphysical beliefs; 
2. Our entrenched metaphysical view of the material world is object-based; 
3. Postulating objects as fundamental entities leads to a problematic metaphysical 
underdetermination (between individual objects and non-individual objects) in the 
ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics - which is a fundamental theory in 
current physics, and certainly one that realists need to take into account; 
4. A structuralist reconstruction of the quantum domain, according to which objects 
are not fundamental, is possible; 
5. A structuralist reconstruction of material objects gets rid of the underdetermination 
mentioned in 3, and thus satisfies 1; 
C. There are compelling reasons for adopting a structuralist metaphysics.
5
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 Notice that, while ESR relies on preserved structure in general and can point to particular 
historical cases, as long as it is justified along the lines being considered here OSR needs 
instead a specific realist attitude with respect to a specific theory – which, incidentally, is 
the object of heavy philosophical dispute. Obviously enough, realism about quantum 
mechanics cannot in turn be based on OSR, on pain of circularity. In view of this, OSR 
appears parasitic on ESR (other realist positions, we will assume here, having been ruled 
out on the basis of the PMI). One may complain that one should be allowed to just endorse 
a generic „realist stance‟ and then specify further what form of realism is best justified. 
  
Premise 2 is uncontroversial, and premise 4 has been assumed to be unproblematic in this 
paper. As for premise 1, it appears quite sensible and at least one respected OSRist openly 
accepts it (French 2006, 177). What about the other premises? 
The claim in 3 has to do with the fact that quantum particles have features that make them 
strikingly different from classical particles and from the paradigmatic individual objects of 
everyday life. They do not obey the Leibnizian Principle of the Identity of the 
Indiscernibles (PII), as they can have all the same properties
6
; and they are 
„indistinguishable‟, so that (very roughly) there are two ways in which two coins can be 
one heads and the other tails but only one way in which two fermions can be one spin up 
and the other spin down. It allegedly follows from this that either particles are non-
individuals
7
 - they do not have well-defined identities - or they are individuals whose 
                                                                                                                                                                                
However, this would mean to ignore the strength of the PMI, which, by putting the NMA 
into doubt, makes such a generic realist stance unviable even within realist circles. Hence, 
ESR must indeed be presupposed by OSRists. (Incidentally, this lends further support to 
the view of the relationship between ESR and OSR argued for in the previous section). 
6
 This claim is in need of qualification, as we will see in the next section. This is 
immaterial to the reconstruction of the argument from underdetermination. 
7
 By which, on what seems to be the most plausible interpretation, one means that they are 
not basic ontological constituents, but rather „derivative‟ manifestations of something more 
fundamental: for example, one might say that a system of two indiscernible bosons is in 
fact a bosonic field with a certain „two-unit‟ perturbation at a given point. (The more 
  
individuality is not analysable in terms of qualitative features (and is provided instead by 
bare particulars, „haecceitates‟ or what have you), and whose statistical behaviour is due to 
some specific non-classical aspect of the relevant domain.
8
 The non-individuality option 
appears naturally to explain the impossibility of individuation via description or direct 
reference, and the peculiarity of quantum statistics („no identities to be permuted‟). The 
individuality view, on the other hand, agrees with commonsense and with the ontological 
presuppositions that hold true in the classical domain. 
According to OSRists, there are no conclusive arguments in favour of either option (rather, 
problems on both sides), but the metaphysical dilemma can be dissolved altogether by 
opting for a structuralist perspective that posits relations and not objects as fundamental.
9
  
However, consider again the two metaphysical „packages‟ just identified. To be sure, each 
one of them meshes better with certain specific metaphysical theses about objects, 
properties and identity conditions than with others. And, indeed, it is equally 
uncontroversial that there is no way to choose one package, with its related set of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
fundamental something need not be understood structurally: an ontology without 
individuals is not ipso facto an ontology of relations only). 
8
 This can be achieved in a number of ways (none of which absolutely uncontroversial, of 
course): for a discussion of them – and a proposal – see Morganti 2009.  
9
 Essentially because, if objects are derivative on structures, the peculiar features they 
exhibit in the quantum domain need not be explained against a more or less traditional 
ontological background, and can instead be attributed directly to the more fundamental - 
structural - level. 
  
metaphysical theses, rather than another exclusively on the basis of the available data. But 
this is not a problem for the typical metaphysician! For, far from expecting to be able to 
extract well-defined metaphysical theses from the best available scientific descriptions of 
things, s/he always anticipates that this is normally not the case, and other factors will have 
to be brought to bear. As a matter of fact, the typical metaphysician starts from certain 
metaphysical views - arrived at on mostly a priori grounds - and evaluates how these fare 
with respect to a range of considerations including, but not reducing to, an assessment of 
how those views fit with the input coming from the actual world. In view of this, it seems 
fair to say that, in the case under scrutiny, metaphysicians (at least those who have clear 
opinions about the constitution of material objects and their individuation) would simply 
disagree with the claim that there is a problematic underdetermination. An ontological 
account of the relevant domain, they would argue, can be provided in the framework of 
either one of the two object-based ontologies – one just needs to be clear about the 
assumptions needed to do this (and the consequences of each interpretation).
10
  
A sensible reply to this is that a priori considerations never provide us with firm grounds 
for choosing one set of assumptions over others, and so we can (and should) only do 
metaphysics a posteriori, so dismissing traditional metaphysical arguments altogether. That 
this is what OSRists think is suggested by the fact that in the extant formulations of the 
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 More generally, from the point of view of traditional metaphysics there doesn‟t seem to 
be more underdetermination in quantum mechanics than in any other domain of reality that 
we attempt to characterise in metaphysical terms. On this point, see (Chakravartty 2007, 
74-75). 
  
argument under consideration they just state that there are different object-based accounts 
of the particles‟ nature, and do not engage a critical examination. The problem with this 
reply, though, is that the OSRist claim being assessed is simply that standard object-
oriented realism, based as it is on traditional metaphysical presuppositions, meets with an 
insurmountable problem of underdetermination when it comes to interpreting quantum 
mechanics. At no point are methodological considerations about what counts as „proper‟ 
metaphysics brought into play. 
In light of the above, it appears legitimate to reject premise 3 above. But let us accept that 
premise for the sake of argument. At least two interrelated questions are left outstanding: 
isn‟t the structuralist option also underdetermined by the available evidence? Why exactly 
should one think that it provides a way out of the underdetermination being pointed at?  
As for the first question, perhaps the thought is that the structuralist view is not a third 
option, but rather a sort of „synthesis‟ between the individuality and the non-individuality 
packages. That this is not the case, however, appears quite clear: both the individuality and 
non-individuality views are based on objects and monadic properties (possessed by or 
constituting the former) as fundamental; consequently, relations do not constitute a 
„common core‟ between the two. Moreover, if a synthesis is what one is looking for, there 
is a large number of properties that are shared by the two accounts, and about which a 
realist can be realist without also taking a stance regarding the nature of objects in general - 
certainly without being led to take only relations seriously.
11
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 Saatsi (2010) voices similar doubts. The OSRist may argue that, unlike the „selective 
sceptic‟ (see Chakravartty 2003, 2007) who restricts his/her realist commitment to some of 
  
For what concerns the second question, OSRists often say that one should re-conceptualise 
the quantum domain in terms of physical structures as primitives, from which objects 
„emerge‟ as relational „nodes‟ (French 2006, 183). But (even) if objects emerge, don‟t we 
have to account for their (non-)individuality anyway? Compare with mathematical 
structuralism. Even once each element, say, in the structure of natural numbers is defined 
purely structurally, every natural number has definite identity conditions. Therefore - at 
least relative to one‟s assumptions about what being an individual exactly means - one is in 
a position to state whether natural numbers are individual or non-individual objects. What 
about physical objects? The only reaction available to OSRists seems to be to regard the 
latter as entirely „epiphenomenal‟, and thus not requiring (nor permitting) any 
metaphysical elucidation. 
This is enough to suggest that it is far from clear that structuralism is the most natural and 
least costly solution to the (alleged) problem of underdetermination. In light of this, one 
may legitimately put premise 5 above into doubt. 
More generally, there are grounds for contending that the argument for OSR based on the 
(alleged) underdetermination of metaphysics by non-relativistic quantum mechanics is 
unsound, and thus cannot constitute the basis for a compelling justification of OSR. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
the properties of things while sticking to a „canonical‟ understanding of the latter, the 
structuralist can focus more directly on these properties as they emerge from the theory 
itself. This, however, presupposes the plausibility of the ontic structuralist realist view, 
which is clearly different from a generic property-based realism. 
  
4. The argument from the primacy of relations 
If the arguments presented in the previous section are correct, merely „negative‟ 
considerations against other forms of realism (based on the alleged shortcomings of the 
latter with respect to the interpretation of physical theory) are not sufficient for a 
persuasive justification of OSR. Consequently, the OSRist will have to provide direct, 
„positive‟ support for his/her structuralist ontology. This leads us to the critical assessment 
of a second argument for OSR that can be found in the recent literature. 
It has been contended (Saunders 2006; Muller and Saunders 2008; Muller and Seevinck 
2009) that quantum particles are not discernible on the basis of the „canonical‟ versions of 
PII – which only quantify over monadic properties - but are in fact discerned „weakly‟ by 
non-supervenient, irreflexive and symmetric relations such as „has opposite spin to‟ and, 
consequently, via some Leibnizian principle that takes relations of this type into account. 
At least once one accepts that metaphysically genuine relations need not be reducible to 
monadic properties nor depend on the existence of already well-defined relata, such weak 
discernibility of quantum particles entails that the non-individuality option above is 
untenable. This, in turn, may seem to mean that the underdetermination is broken and, as a 
consequence, OSR is undermined. However, Muller (forthcoming) contends that only the 
first conjunct of this latter claim is true: for, objects which are only weakly discernible 
entirely depend on relations for their identity, and such relationals fit the structuralist 
picture perfectly well. In fact, Muller argues, the „discovery‟ that quantum particles are 
relationals is very good news for the OSRist. 
  
This, of course, provided that not only the identity-determining factors but all properties 
are shown to be (reducible to) relations. 
It doesn‟t come as a surprise, then, that a structuralist analysis of all physical properties has 
been undertaken by several philosophers, with the aim of showing that objects and 
monadic properties are „idle‟ and play no role whatsoever in physical theory, and there 
consequently are good reasons for believing that nothing exists over and above structure.
12
 
Notice that, quite importantly, what must be shown for this argument to be effective is not 
only that all properties of things depend on things other than those exemplifying them (i.e., 
that no property is intrinsic and non-relational), but also that – more strongly - every 
property is a relation. 
OSRists customarily (French 1999, 2003; Ladyman 2009, Sec. 4.1) quote or mention 
historical figures such as Cassirer, Born, Weyl and Eddington as authoritative exponents of 
the view that objects coincide with the identification of invariants with respect to the 
mathematics relevant to the theory; and then connect these historical remarks to more 
theoretical considerations. Muller (forthcoming), for example, argues that the (allegedly) 
monadic and intrinsic (essential) properties of quantum particles are in fact invariants of 
the symmetry groups that define the qualitative features of quantum mechanical systems, 
and are consequently reducible to the relations that constitute those groups.
13
 Others 
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 In particular, positive arguments coming directly from physics are taken by OSRists to 
ground, together with historical considerations, a sort of „consilience‟ in favour of their 
position (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 161). 
13
 See also (Castellani 1998) and (French 2000). 
  
(Kantorovich 2003; Lyre 2004) argue in analogous fashion that in gauge quantum field 
theories objects are secondary to structure because symmetries are fundamental in the 
constitution of fields. In general, OSRists interpret the mathematical nature of physical 
theory and the fact that all physical properties must be „extracted‟ somehow from 
symmetries and invariants that can be traced in the formalism of the theory as clear signs 
that the things described by the theory and their properties are themselves reducible to the 
relations that define such symmetries and invariants. 
Now, whether or not this way of drawing metaphysical consequences from features of the 
language that we use to describe things is considered acceptable - a complex issue we will 
not discuss here -, it seems undeniable that the claims made by OSRists in the present 
context are considerably unclear. What does it mean, exactly, that objects and properties 
are/reduce to invariants, or that symmetries are ontologically prior to objects? 
As a matter of fact, it looks like an important distinction is overlooked (or consciously 
ignored) here between the formal definition of general, abstract properties on the one hand 
and the concrete property-instances that exist in the material world on the other. Indeed, 
the claim, say, that objects and properties can be picked out via the identification of 
invariants across transformations in the groups that define the relevant theoretical structure 
seems to rest on a fatal conflation of these two elements. When one focuses on invariants 
and the likes, one moves at a high level of abstractness, involving the „general properties of 
the general properties‟, so to put it, of types of things. Object- and property-tokens can 
certainly not be „found‟ there. For instance, one can say (with Weyl) that all quantum 
numbers are indices characterising representations of groups; but while this provides the 
  
basis, for instance, for distinguishing fermions and bosons at the abstract theoretical level, 
it doesn‟t in any way ground a reduction of the actual properties of an actual fermion or 
boson, which (perhaps with the exception of spin) simply are not the immediate referents 
of those indices. Thinking otherwise would be like, say, expecting the actual causal 
features shared by coloured material things to be reducible to the general features shared 
by abstract concepts and words such as „Redness‟, „Greenness‟ etc.14 
Note that the difference involved here is a difference of category: on one side, there are the 
properties of the abstract, formal structures used to describe the physical world, on the 
other the properties of concrete things. Consequently, it won‟t do for the OSRist to just 
claim that the specific property-instances of specific actual objects can be extracted via a 
structural analysis of the theoretical apparatuses employed for describing individual 
physical systems
15
, for that would (perhaps) deflate the general/particular distinction, but 
there would still be a gap between the concrete and the abstract. 
The only remaining option for OSRists is to refuse the request for philosophical analysis 
on the basis that there is no need to explain how the physical is to be extracted from the 
abstract. But this can only mean either that i) the physical is eliminated and abstract 
structure is directly invested with the role of ontologically fundamental entity; or ii) that 
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 Incidentally, notice that the „indices characterising representations of groups‟ are 
something different from the general relations peculiar to those groups. 
15
 For instance, by moving from global symmetry groups that apply to entire fields to 
localised groups describing local fields. 
  
the abstract and the concrete are indeed distinct, but the specific way in which they are 
related is sufficiently graspable for OSR to be compelling without further elaboration. 
Option i) amounts to a form of realism about mathematical, not physical, structure (for 
something going in this direction, see Tegmark 2007). Beside having been ruled out at the 
outset here, such a view is certainly regarded as a minority view, and one that is more 
revisionary than one would hope, among OSRists themselves. As for ii), it seems to be the 
view underlying, for instance, Ladyman and Ross‟ refusal to say anything about what 
makes a structure physical rather than mathematical (2007, 158). However, such a refusal 
will hardly appear motivated to those not already convinced by OSR. To be sure, any 
revisionary thesis bears the burden of proof, i.e., needs to be supported by explicit 
arguments when it comes to a comparative assessment. 
Nor is the case for OSR made any stronger by a further consideration of contemporary 
physics. Muller, for example, mentions results related to relativistic quantum field theories 
(the „Casimir effect‟, showing that the physical vacuum contains no particles but is not 
devoid of physical activity; and existing proofs to the effect that both the number and the 
localizability of particles become frame-dependent in a relativistic context) to conclude 
that objects really find no room in our best science anymore, and we should consequently 
make do with relations only. However, to what extent do these results put into question the 
notion of an object rather than „just‟ the concept of a classical (i.e., well-localised etc.) 
object? Or, consider space-time physics: while the hole argument and related 
considerations certainly represent a problem for the naïve substantivalist, it is far from 
  
generally agreed that a structuralist understanding of space-time is the most plausible 
option in view of them. 
In conclusion, then, the argument for OSR based on the (alleged) priority of relations over 
objects and monadic properties - witnessed by contemporary physics - can also be deemed 
unsatisfactory. 
 
From this and what was said in the previous section, it can be concluded that both 
arguments provided so far in support of OSR are unconvincing. In fact, once they are 
appropriately disentangled and analysed, it can be seen that several considerations are 
often run together based on the erroneous feeling that they complement and strengthen 
each other. This gives the wrong impression that a full-blown argument for OSR has been 
provided. To the contrary, OSR may well be a possible realist position, but it is far from 
clear that it has been supplied with a compelling justification and, therefore, that it truly is 
the most forceful option available to the scientific realist. 
  
References 
Cao, Tian Y. 2003. “Structural Realism and the Interpretation of Quantum Field 
Theory.” Synthese 136: 3–24. 
Castellani, Elena. 1998. “Galilean Particles: An Example of Constitution of Objects.” 
In Interpreting Bodies: Classical and Quantum Objects in Modern Physics, ed. Elena 
Castellani, 181-194. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2003. “The Structuralist Conception of Objects.” Philosophy of 
Science 70: 867–878. 
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2007: A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the 
Unobservable. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Esfeld, Michael, and Vincent Lam. 2008. “Moderate Structural Realism about Space-
Time.” Synthese 160: 27–46. 
French, Steven. 1999. “Models and Mathematics in Physics: The Role of Group 
Theory.” In From Physics to Philosophy, ed. Butterfield, Jeremy and Constantine 
Pagonis, C., 187-207. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
French, Steven. 2000. “The Reasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics: Partial 
Structures and the Application of Group Theory to Physics.” Synthese 125: 103–120.  
French, Steven. 2003. “Scribbling on the Blank Sheet: Eddington's Structuralist 
Conception of Objects.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 34: 
227–259.  
French, Steven. 2006. “Structure as a Weapon of the Realist.” Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 106: 167-185.  
  
French, Steven, and James Ladyman. 2003.” Remodelling Structural Realism: 
Quantum Physics and the Metaphysics of Structure.” Synthese 136: 31–56.  
Kantorovich, Aharon. 2003. “The Priority of Internal Symmetries in Particle 
Physics.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 34: 651–675. 
Kincaid, Harold. 2008. “Structural Realism and the Special Sciences.” Philosophy of 
Science 75: 720-731.  
Ladyman, James, and Don Ross (with David Spurrett and John Collier). 2007. Every 
Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalised. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Ladyman, James. 1998. “What is Structural Realism?” Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science 29: 409-424. 
Ladyman, James. 2009. “Structural Realism.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Zalta, Edward N., (Summer 2009 Edition), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/structural-realism/>. 
Laudan, Larry. 1981. “A Confutation of Convergent Realism.” Philosophy of Science 
48: 19–49.  
Lyre, Holger. 2004. “Holism and Structuralism in U(1) Gauge Theory.” Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35: 643–670. 
Mertz, Donald W. 2003.”An Instance Ontology for Structures: Their Definition, 
Identity, and Indiscernibility.” Metaphysica 4: 127-164. 
Morganti, Matteo. 2004. “On the Preferability of Epistemic Structural Realism.” 
Synthese 142: 81-107. 
  
Morganti, Matteo. 2009. “Inherent Properties and Statistics with Individual Particles 
in Quantum Mechanics.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 40: 
223-231. 
Muller, Fred A. Forthcoming. “Whithering Away, Weakly.” Synthese.  
Muller, Fred A., and Simon Saunders. 2008. “Discerning Fermions.” British Journal 
for the Philosophy of Science 59: 499–548. 
Muller, Fred A., and Seevinck, Michael P. 2009. “Discerning Elementary Particles.” 
Philosophy of Science 76: 179-200. 
Poincaré, Henry. 1905/1952. Science and Hypothesis. New York: Dover. 
Putnam, Hilary. 1975. Mathematics, Matter and Method. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Ross, Don. 2008. “Ontic Structural Realism and Economics.” Philosophy of Science 
75: 731-741.  
Saatsi, Juha. 2010. “Whence Ontic Structural Realism?” In EPSA. Epistemology and 
Methodology of Science.Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association, 
ed. Suarez, Mauricio, Mauro Dorato, and Miklos Redei, 255-266. Dordrecht, 
Heidelberg, London, New York: Springer. 
Saunders, Simon. 2006. “Are Quantum Particles Objects?” Analysis 66, 52-63. 
Tegmark, Max. 2007. “The Mathematical Universe.” Foundations of Physics 38: 
101–150. 
Worrall, John. 1989. “Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?” Dialectica 43: 
99–124.  
